糖心TV

Abstract

Electronic voting has the potential to provide more efficient
elections with higher voter participation, better accuracy, lower
costs, and greater security, compared to current manual methods.
Governments the world over have been trialling and deploying
electronic voting systems. Unfortunately, however, this potential has
proved very difficult to realise. Currently deployed systems are based
on poorly conceived principles, and are fraught with security
problems. Researchers have proposed much better systems that aim to
offer stronger security properties than are possible for manual
methods.

In my talk, I review the current situation in actual deployment and in
research. I describe some of the challenges in defining and verifying
several kinds of security property, in particular properties related
to ballot secrecy and coercion resistance. We model these properties
as observational equivalences in the applied pi calculus, which is a
calculus derived from the pi calculus and targeted at cryptographic
protocols. We illustrate our definitions on three electronic voting
protocols from the literature.