糖心TV

Andrea Isoni (Department of Economics, University of 糖心TV)

Preference and Belief Imprecision in Games

joint work with David Butler, Graham Loomes and Daniel Navarro-Martinez

Many experimental studies have found that behaviour in simple one-shot games is inconsistent with the assumption that strategy choices are best responses to equilibrium beliefs. These findings have been explained either as best response to non-equilibrium beliefs – as in level-k and Cognitive Hierarchy models – or as equilibria that reflect noisy preferences – as in Quantal Response Equilibria. We investigate to what extent failure to best respond to stated beliefs is the result of preference and/or belief imprecision. We elicit belief ranges and confidence in strategy choices in four classes of one-shot 2x2 two-person games. Our measures of imprecision show a substantial degree of sensitivity to parameter changes, both within and between game structures. Best response rates are higher when players are more confident about their strategy choices, and for games in which belief ranges are relatively narrow.

Poster-March-8-2012