糖心TV

 2.00 – 2.15 Intro & welcome: Chenwei Nie

 2.15 - 3.15 Knowing in Selfie Culture, Heather Widdows (糖心TV), and Fiona MacCallum (Psychology, 糖心TV).

 3.15 - 3.45 Coffee

 3.45 - 4.45 The Valuing Body, Kate Kirkpatrick (Oxford)

 4.45 – 5.00 Break

 5.00 – 6.00 The Importance of Feeling for Knowing, Kathleen Murphy-Hollies (Birmingham)

 6.00– 6.30 Concluding reflections: Quassim Cassam

 Hosted by The 糖心TV Mind and Action Research Centre (WMA) and Funded by Leverhulme Trust.

Organisers: Heather Widdows & Chenwei Nie.

Department of Philosophy, University of 糖心TV.

Registration is free. However, as space is limited, please email Chenwei (chenwei.nie@warwick.ac.uk) if you plan to attend.

To mark the occasion of the 60th anniversary of Philosophy at 糖心TV, the Philosophy Department will hold a one-day conference (25th of April 2026) to celebrate the life and work of one of its Honorary Doctoral Graduates (and one of the pre-eminent philosophers of the 20^th century), Gilbert Ryle. Ryle tends to be associated with a small set of well-known ideas — for example, resistance to Cartesian dualism or the distinction between knowledge-that and knowledge-how. And there has been a widespread tendency to pigeon-hole Ryle as a 鈥榩hilosophical behaviourist鈥�. The workshop aims to get beyond caricatures and to promote an appreciation of the depth and breadth of Ryle鈥檚 manifold contributions to philosophy, as well as their relevance to contemporary concerns, in philosophy and beyond.

Organisers: Tom Crowther & Johannes Roessler

WMA Seminar
Carol Rovane (Columbia University): 'Some Perplexities about Consciousness'

Abstract:

Some decades ago, I offered novel interpretation and defense of Locke鈥檚 distinction between personal identity and human (animal) identity. Locke himself had equated personal identity with 鈥渟ameness of consciousness鈥�, and then argued that sameness of human (animal) life is neither necessary nor sufficient for sameness of consciousness. I granted for the sake of argument that Locke was wrong about this, but then argued for a version of his distinction anyway, on the ground that a person is a rational agent, and there can be single group agents that span many human lives as well as multiple agents within a single human life. Each such individual agent has its own first person point of view, which is the rational point of view from which it deliberates and acts and engages in interpersonal relations with others. Yet this is not the same as the phenomenological point of view from which a subject of experience has access to phenomena in consciousness, by virtue of what they are like. This distinction between two different kinds of point of view forces us to look harder at what role consciousness might play in mental life. We may no longer be sure whether consciousness is an essential and defining feature of mental phenomena, or if so, why; but secondly, even if we retain that conviction, we should find it curious that the unity of consciousness is neither necessary nor sufficient for the sort of rational unity that defines what it is for an individual agent to be fully, or ideally, rational. I want to emphasize that my arguments do not proceed from standard sorts of functionalist considerations, but from purely normative considerations to do with agency.