糖心TV

Working Papers:

• Optimal Subsidy Design: We study a principal–agent model with observable actions and private costs and introduce a constructive 鈥�constraint-ironing鈥� method mapping primitives to optimal subsidies. It provides exact tests for pooling via an effective virtual marginal cost, implies zero subsidies/rents when the default is optimal, and shows that stronger diminishing returns shrink pooling and payments, while a default farther from the principal鈥檚 preferred action expands pooling and subsidies.
• Epistemic Coalition Formation: We study coalition formation when players can merge only by sharing their knowledge; with actions conditioned on posterior knowledge structures within coalitions, equilibria are characterized by the initial knowledge profile.

Teaching

• EC107: Economics 1 (Term 1)
• EC109: Microeconomics 1 (Term 2)