糖心TV

Invited speakers:

Marian Boguna, University of Barcelona, Spain

Ginestra Bianconi, ICTP, Triste, Italy

Matteo Marsili, ICTP, Trieste, Italy

Hyunggyu Park, KAIST, Korea

Jorge Pacheco, University of Lisboa, Portugal

Alexander Goltsev, University of Aveiro, Portugal

Alexander Samukhin, University of Aveiro, Portugal

Adilson E. Motter, Northwestern University, USA

Yamir Moreno, Institute for Biocomputation and Physics of Complex Systems, Zaragoza, Spain

Zoltan Toroczkai, University of Notre Dame, USA

Florent Zrzakala, ESPCI, Paris, France

Conference contact address:

Physics Department
3810-193 Aveiro
Portugal
Telf: +351 234 378 104 /+351 917 585 544
Fax: +351 234 424 965
email: jfmendes@ua.pt / sdorogov@ua.pt

CO904 Stat Mech

Lectures by Ellak Somfai, shared with PX439

Title: When small groups of players are effective ...

Abstract: When almost all gains to collective economic (or, more generally, social) activities can be realized by cooperation only within relatively small groups of players and groups form whenever it is to the advantage of their memberships to do so, then there are outcomes of collective activities that are stable and efficient. Such outcomes can be characterized as outcomes of optimizing, price-taking individualistic behavior. This presentation is based primarily on three papers; the first, Wooders (1994), is relatively simple while the other two more recent papers are more complex.

References: 

1. Allouch, N., J. Conley and M. Wooders (2007) "Anonymous price taking equilibrium in Tiebout Economies with a continuum of agents; Existence and characterization," Journal of Mathematical Economics (forthcoming).
2. Wooders, M. (1994) "Equivalence of games and markets," Econometrica 62, 1141-1160.
3. Wooders, M. (2007) "Small group effectiveness, per capita boundedness and nonemptiness of approximate cores," Journal of Mathematical Economics (forthcoming).