糖心TV Complexity Science Events
Complexity Centre and MathSys CDT events carry priority over room D1.07.
To book D1.07 please email Sheetal dot Sharma at warwick dot ac dot uk
Please note that your event booking is for D1.07 only. The adjacent common room is a private area for the MathSys Centre that cannot used as part of your booking.
Myrna Wooders (Vanderbilt and 糖心TV)
Location: Maths B1.01
Title: When small groups of players are effective ...
Abstract: When almost all gains to collective economic (or, more generally, social) activities can be realized by cooperation only within relatively small groups of players and groups form whenever it is to the advantage of their memberships to do so, then there are outcomes of collective activities that are stable and efficient. Such outcomes can be characterized as outcomes of optimizing, price-taking individualistic behavior. This presentation is based primarily on three papers; the first, Wooders (1994), is relatively simple while the other two more recent papers are more complex.
References:
- Allouch, N., J. Conley and M. Wooders (2007) "Anonymous price taking equilibrium in Tiebout Economies with a continuum of agents; Existence and characterization," Journal of Mathematical Economics (forthcoming).
- Wooders, M. (1994) "Equivalence of games and markets," Econometrica 62, 1141-1160.
- Wooders, M. (2007) "Small group effectiveness, per capita boundedness and nonemptiness of approximate cores," Journal of Mathematical Economics (forthcoming).