ÌÇÐÄTV

Skip to main content Skip to navigation

Incredible beliefs: Understanding clear-eyed believing against the evidence

Incredible beliefs:

Understanding clear-eyed believing against the evidence

Project Abstract

Existing work in philosophy and psychology tends to assume that if a person believes something against the evidence, then this person must have failed to properly evaluate the relevant evidence. This assumption, however, overlooks a distinctive form of irrationality, where subjects obstinately hold onto their beliefs, despite acknowledging that the evidence points to the contrary. My project investigates this uncharted territory in human irrationality by exploring the enigma across a spectrum of irrational beliefs and developing a plausible explanation of it. According to this explanation, irrational beliefs are sometimes explained by subjects’ compelling experiences, rather than failures to properly evaluate evidence.

---

Related Publications

(2026). . In E. Schmidt & M. Grajner (Eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas and Epistemic Normativity (pp. 165–184). Routledge.

(2025). . Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 103(4), 994-1010.

(2025) . Neuroethics, 18, article 4, 1-5.

(2025). . Southern Journal of Philosophy. 63(3): 429-443

Blog post

(2025) . Imperfect Cognitions.

---

Contact: Chenwei Nie

ÌÇÐÄTV Mind and Action Research Centre (WMA).

Funded by a Leverhulme Trust Early Career Fellowship (10.2024-09.2027).

Forthcoming events

Stay tuned...

Past events

5.

"When knowledge isn't power" Workshop (25 March 2025)

Details: click here.

4.
Self-Awareness and Intersubjectivity Conference (12-13 March 2025)

Details: click here.

3.
Project Seminar

Date:Wednesday, 22 October 2025

Location:S0.11,Social Sciences Building

Chair: Melina Macfadyen

Schedule:

14:05-14:55

Speaker: Michelle Liu (Monash)

Title:Mental Imagery and Harmful Language*

14:55-15:05

Coffee Break

15:05-15:50

Q&A

2.
Project Workshop

Date:Wednesday, 25 June 2025

Location:(Click to open an interactive map)

Theme:Incredible delusions

Schedule:

16:00 - 17:25

Speaker: Matthew Parrott (Oxford)

Title:Dynamic delusions

Chair: Oli Needham

17:25 - 17:35

Coffee Break

17:35 - 19:00

Speaker: Johannes Roessler (ÌÇÐÄTV)

Title:Parnas on empirical and bizarre delusions

Chair: Emma Clinton

1.
Project Workshop

Date:Wednesday, 22 January 2025

Location:(Click to open an interactive map)

Theme:Experience and Rationality

Schedule:

14:00 - 15:30

Speaker: Alexander Greenberg (Southampton/Oxford)

Title:Consciousness and CognitiveMens Rea

Chair: Lucy Campbell

15:30 - 15:45

Coffee Break

15:45 - 17:15

Speaker: Guy Longworth (ÌÇÐÄTV)

Title:Perception's Authority

Chair: Eve Poirier

17:15 - 17:30

Coffee Break

17:30 - 19:00

Speaker: Janset Özün Çetinkaya (Nottingham)

Title:Akrasia and Self-Deception in Aristotle

Chair: Eve Poirier

The Leverhulme Trust

Let us know you agree to cookies