糖心TV

Skip to main content Skip to navigation

Postgraduate "Work In Progress" Seminar

Postgraduate Work-In-Progress Seminar

A weekly seminar for Philosophy postgraduates to present their in-progress work, followed by a well-spirited trip to the pub for food and drinks.


Useful Info

The WIP provides a risk-free and supportive space for postgraduates to present their work and receive feedback from other graduates and faculty.

  • When: Every Thursday (5pm to 6:15pm)
  • Where: Room S1.50 (Social Sciences Building, First Floor)
  • What: 30-minute presentation, followed by Q&A.

Attendance optional but highly recommended. All postgraduates are welcome to present or attend -- whether MA, MPhil, PhD, Visitors, etc.


馃搮 Format


  • Presentation: 30 minutes
  • Open Discussion / Q&A: 30 minutes
  • Material: Anything, really -- assessed essay (for MAs), a supervision essay (for MPhils), or a thesis section (for PhDs), ...
  • Style: Flexible -- slides, handouts, or simply talking.
  • Audience: No prior reading or background knowledge expected. Visiting PhDs should can present.

馃 Should I present? ("I have nothing to present; I hate public speaking; etc.")


  • Are you a postgraduate? Then yes, you should present.
  • In other words, all graduates are encouraged to present at least once.
  • The WIP is a unique opportunity for graduates to develop their public speaking / writing skills, take risks, test out theses, and get constructive feedback from peers.*
  • Presentations need not (in fact, should not) be watertight or polished pieces at all. You are encouraged to present work at all stages of the writing process -- first drafts, substantial sets of notes, etc.
  • Simply signing up for a date is a great way to give yourself a deadline to work towards. (This is what most people do.)
 
NEXT TALK

Fridolin Neumann

(PhD)

Heidegger


Thursday 30/04/2026

5pm - 6:15pm

S1.50


ORGANISERS

Tiago Rodrigues

Lucas Menezes 

   

 

Show all calendar items

PG WiP Seminar - Emma Clinton: DECEPTION & THE ETHICS OF CONSENT

- Export as iCalendar
Location: S2.77

Abstract

How we determine the scope of consent – the range of actions that consent applies to – has implications on the discussion of deception in sex.

Some philosophers endorse the view that deception鈥檚 moral effect on consent can be, at least partly, explained by the fact that an act that someone consented to is not actually the act that is carried out (where the act carried out does not fall within the scope of their consent). If this is the case, then delineating which acts are within the scope of consent can provide us with a partial account of which acts could be morally impermissible as a result of deception.

However, this approach needs to be able to deal with cases where deception might be the only way in which to avoid discriminatory consequences, ideally avoiding the conclusion that deception in these cases are serious moral wrongs.

I will be looking at Dougherty鈥檚 approach to get around this problem, namely building in moral reasonableness into how we determine the scope of consent. I will be arguing that this approach fails, and that if we want consent to remain a useful moral concept which is able to protect people鈥檚 autonomy, the scope of consent should be an epistemically reasonable interpretation of the expression of consent.

Show all calendar items

Let us know you agree to cookies