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Postgraduate "Work In Progress" Seminar

Postgraduate Work-In-Progress Seminar

A weekly seminar for Philosophy postgraduates to present their in-progress work, followed by a well-spirited trip to the pub.


Overview

The WIP provides a risk-free and supportive space for postgraduates to present their work and receive feedback from other graduates and faculty.

  • When: Every Thursday (5pm to 6:15pm)
  • Where: Room S1.50 (Social Sciences Building, First Floor)
  • What: Presentation + Q&A

Attendance optional but highly recommended. All postgraduates are welcome to present or attend -- whether MA, MPhil, PhD, Visitors, etc.


Useful Info

The WIP is a unique opportunity for graduates to develop their presenting and writing skills, take risks, test out ideas, and receive constructive feedback from peers.

  • Presentation: 30 minutes
  • Open Discussion / Q&A: 30 minutes
  • Material: Work in progress (essay drafts, thesis sections, a substantial set of notes, ... ).
  • Style: Flexible. Slides, handouts, or neither.
  • Audience: No prior reading or background knowledge expected. All are encouraged to attend and present (including visiting postgraduates).

Presentations need not be watertight or polished pieces at all. You are encouraged to present work at all stages of the writing process.


Should you present?

Are you a postgraduate? Then yes, you should present.

 
NEXT TALK

Ben Long

(PhD)

Scepticism


Thursday 04/06/2026

5pm - 6:15pm

S1.50


ORGANISERS

Tiago Rodrigues

Lucas Menezes 

   

 

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PG Work in Progress Seminar

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Location: S2.77/online

Title: "Moral supervenience and non-naturalism: assessing Jackson鈥檚 challenge"

Thursday 16th February 2023

5pm in S2.77 and on .

 Everyone welcome!

 Abstract:

Frank Jackson has argued that, given that every moral predicate is necessarily coextensive with a natural one, moral properties are identical to natural ones. Against this, Jussi Suikkanen has responded with an appeal to Leibniz鈥檚 Law, which states that any two identical entities share all of their properties. If moral properties were just natural properties, then moral properties would share all of their higher-order properties with natural ones. A moral non-naturalist – someone who thinks moral properties are not identical with natural properties – can then argue for distinctive higher-order properties that set the moral realm apart. Classically, non-naturalist moral epistemology has asserted that moral knowledge is obtained in a unique way: by reflection, rather than empirical investigation. The non-naturalist can then argue that moral properties have distinctive epistemic properties of their own. I will argue that this cannot be used as a reply against Jackson.

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