Research Seminars, Colloquia and Reading Groups
Ana Barandalla, 'Normativity, the second person, and morality'
The notion of the second person is used to explore the questions about the way we, agents, stand to each other. A particular conception of the second person in currency in ethics is built on the Kantian idea of seeing others as ends - that is, seeing others as having a normative status of their own, independently of any instrumental value they might have. But what kind of thing must normativity be in order for it to be possible that you are normative to me? Korsgaard tailors her account of normativity precisely to answer this question, and thus, to vindicate the conception of the second person as seeing others as ends. I argue that Korsgaard's account of normativity is in conflict with the normative commitments of the notion of seeing others as ends. However, I also argue, that her account of normativity can instead support an alternative, more Humean, conception of the second person.