糖心TV

Abstract:

Recent comparative work has identified systematic cross-national variation in the investment behavior of pension funds. To explain this variation, emphasis has been placed on understanding the investment preferences of employer-sponsors and plan members, as well as on understanding how pension fund governance arrangements structure the investment influence of these actors. In this paper I try to build on this work by drawing attention to the ongoing ‘de-risking’ of UK pension funds, a phenomenon which is puzzling when viewed in light of the preferences and investment influence of plan members and sponsors. Informed by the UK case, I develop the argument that the investment behavior of pension funds may be significantly shaped by pension professionals, and the regulatory context in which they operate. A second case study shows that this argument has relevance beyond Anglophone countries; even in the German context where conservative investment behavior is expected to reflect employee representation in pension fund governance.

 

Short bio:

Margarita joined the department in September as an Assistant Professor in Public Policy. Before joining PAIS, she taught at the University of East London, at UCL, and at the LSE, where she completed a PhD on the subject of pension politics. Margarita's research in public policy is comparative, with a focus on how rich democracies deal with prevalent forms of economic inequality. She is currently working on projects related to: the politics of welfare reforms that benefit labour market outsiders; public support for tax progressivity and redistributive government spending; populist policy responses to inequality; and the politics of pension fund capitalism. Theoretically, she is interested in how institutional context shapes the preferences and influence of a variety of actors involved in policymaking - from the public, to political parties and interest groups.