Francesco Squintani
Research Page
Working Papers
Information Transmission and Commitment in Alliances, with Raghul S. Venkatesh. Coming soon.
Conspiration Networks, with Antonio Cabrales and Christian Ghiglino. Coming soon.
Data Management and Vulnerable Individuals, with Rossella Argenziano. Coming soon.
Information Revelation in Constant-Sum Games: Elections and Beyond (2025), with Navin Kartik and Katrin Tinn, revised and resubmitted to Theoretical Economics. This paper supersedes Information Revelation and Pandering in Elections (2024).
Optimal Overspecified Contracts (2025), revision requested at Review of Economic Studies.
The Choice of Political Advisors (2025), with Dimitri Migrow and Hyungmin Park.
An Organizational Theory of Unionizations (2024), with Anja Prummer.
Political Competition and Strategic Voting in Multi-Candidate Elections (2024), with Dan Bernhardt and Stefan Krasa.
Information Economics
Strategic Disclosure in Networks (2025), Theoretical Economics, forthcoming. This paper supersedes Information Transmission in Political Networks (2018).
The Design of Information Acquisition and Sharing (2023), with Dimitri Migrow, Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics, 1(4): 710-745.
On the Direction of Innovation (2021), with Hugo Hopenhayn, Journal of Political Economy, 129(7): 1991–2022.
Strategic Information Acquisition and Transmission鈥� (2016), with Rossella Argenziano and Sergei Severinov, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 8(3): 119-155.
Patent Rights and Innovation Disclosure鈥� (2016), with Hugo Hopenhayn, Review of Economic Studies, 83(1): 199–230.
Strategic Information Transmission Networks鈥� (2013), with Andrea Galeotti and Christian Ghiglino, Journal of Economic Theory, 148(5): 1751–1769; Extended Working Paper.
Overconfidence and Adverse Selection: The Case of Insurance鈥� (2013), with Alvaro Sandroni, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 93(C): 149-165.
Preemption Games with Private Information鈥� (2011), with Hugo Hopenhayn, Review of Economic Studies, 78(2): 667-692.
Competitive Experimentation with Private Information: The Survivor鈥檚 Curse鈥� (2009), with Giuseppe Moscarini, Journal of Economic Theory, 145(1): 339-360; Extended Working Paper.
Individual Accountability in Teams鈥� (2009), with Leslie Marx, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 72(1): 260-273.
Overconfidence, Insurance and Paternalism鈥� (2007), with Alvaro Sandroni, American Economic Review, 97(5): 1994-2004.
Naive Audience and Communication Bias鈥� (2006), with Marco Ottaviani, International Journal of Game Theory, 35(1): 129-150.
Credulity, Lies and Costly Talk鈥� (2006), with Navin Kartik and Marco Ottaviani, Journal of Economic Theory, 134(1): 93-116.
Imitation and Experimentation in Changing Contests鈥� (2002), with Juuso Valimaki, Journal of Economic Theory, 104(2): 376-404.
Political Economy
Third Party Intervention and Strategic Militarization (2022), with Adam Meirowitz, Massimo Morelli and Kris Ramsay, Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 17(1): 31–59.
Dispute Resolution Institutions and Strategic Militarization鈥� (2019), with Adam Meirowitz, Massimo Morelli and Kris Ramsay, Journal of Political Economy, 127(1): 378-418.
Leadership with Trustworthy Associates鈥� (2018), with Torun Dewan, American Political Science Review, 112(4): 844-859.
In Defence of Factions (2016), with Torun Dewan, American Journal of Political Science, 60:(4) 860–881.
Mediation and Peace鈥� (2015), with Johannes Horner and Massimo Morelli, Review of Economic Studies, 82(4): 1483–1501.
Information Aggregation and Optimal Selection of the Executive鈥� (2014), with Torun Dewan, Andrea Galeotti and Christian Ghiglino, American Journal of Political Science, 59(2): 475–494.
Competence and Ideology鈥� (2011), with Dan Bernhardt and Odilon Camara, Review of Economic Studies, 78(2): 487-522.
The Case for Responsible Parties鈥� (2009), with Dan Bernhardt and John Duggan, American Political Science Review, 103(4): 570–587.
On the Benefits of Party Competition鈥� (2009), with Dan Bernhardt, Larissa Campuzano and Odilon Camara, Games and Economic Behavior, 66(2): 685-70.
Private Polling in Elections and Voters Welfare鈥� (2009), with Dan Bernhardt and John Duggan, Journal of Economic Theory, 144(5): 2021-2056.
Mediation, Arbitration and Negotiation鈥� (2009), with Maria Goltsman, Johannes Horner, and Gregory Pavlov, Journal of Economic Theory, 144(4): 1397-1420.
Electoral Competition with Privately Informed Candidates鈥� (2007), with Dan Bernhardt and John Duggan, Games and Economic Behavior, 58(1): 1-29.
Voting and Communication with Double-Sided Information鈥� (2003), with Ulrich Doraszelski and Dino Gerardi, Contributions to Theoretical Economics: 3(1): Art. 6.
Game Theory
Equilibrium and Mistaken Self-Perception鈥� (2006), Economic Theory, 27(3): 615-641.
Backward Induction and Model Forgetfulness鈥� (2004), Advances in Theoretical Economics, 4(1): Article 2.
Moral Hazard, Renegotiation, and Forgetfulness鈥� (2003), Games and Economic Behavior, 44(1): 98-113.
Survey Articles
Information Aggregation in Political Decision Making (2019), in Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, David P. Redlawsk, Ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.
Introduction to a Symposium in Political Economy鈥� (2011), Economic Theory, 49: 513–519.
A Survey on Polling in Elections鈥� (2008), with Dan Bernhardt and John Duggan, in The Political Economy of Democracy, Enriqueta Aragones, Carmen Bevia, Humberto Llavador, and Norman Schofield, Eds., Fundacion BBVA, Madrid, Spain.
A Survey on Overconfidence鈥� (2004), with Alvaro Sandroni.