Applied Microeconomics
Applied Microeconomics
The Applied Microeconomics research group unites researchers working on a broad array of topics within such areas as labour economics, economics of education, health economics, family economics, urban economics, environmental economics, and the economics of science and innovation. The group operates in close collaboration with the CAGE Research Centre.
The group participates in the CAGE seminar on Applied Economics, which runs weekly on Tuesdays at 2:15pm. Students and faculty members of the group present their ongoing work in two brown bag seminars, held weekly on Tuesdays and Wednesdays at 1pm. Students, in collaboration with faculty members, also organise a bi-weekly reading group in applied econometrics on Thursdays at 1pm. The group organises numerous events throughout the year, including the Research Away Day and several thematic workshops.
Our activities
Work in Progress seminars
Tuesdays and Wednesdays 1-2pm
Students and faculty members of the group present their work in progress in two brown bag seminars. See below for a detailed scheduled of speakers.
Applied Econometrics reading group
Thursdays (bi-weekly) 1-2pm
Organised by students in collaboration with faculty members. See the Events calendar below for further details
People
Academics
Academics associated with the Applied Microeconomics Group are:
Research Students
Events
Wednesday, November 28, 2018
-Export as iCalendar |
MTWP Lunchtime Workshop - Olga Gorelkina (Liverpool)S2.79Organiser: Ayush Pant The title of paper is "Collusion via Information Sharing and Optimal Auctions" Abstract - This paper studies collusion via information sharing in the context of auctions. The model of collusion via information sharing builds on Aumann鈥檚 (1976) description of knowledge. Robustness of auction mechanisms to collusion via information sharing is defined as the impossibility of an agreement to collude. A cartel can agree to collude on a contract if it is common knowledge within that cartel that the contract is incentive compatible and individually rational. Robust mechanisms are characterized in a number of settings where some, all, or no bidders are bound by limited liability. Finally, the characterization is used in a simple IPV setting to design a mechanism that is both optimal and robust to collusion. Link to paper |
-Export as iCalendar |
CAGE-AMES Workshop - Maggie Fok/Federico Trombetta (糖心TV)S2.77 Cowling RoomWorkshop organiser - Eric Melander |
-Export as iCalendar |
CRETA Seminar - Joao Ramos (USC Marshall)S2.79This is part of the CRETA Seminar Series, further information will be provided nearer the date. Seminar organisers: Sinem Hidir and Costas Cavounidis |