Applied Microeconomics
Applied Microeconomics
The Applied Microeconomics research group unites researchers working on a broad array of topics within such areas as labour economics, economics of education, health economics, family economics, urban economics, environmental economics, and the economics of science and innovation. The group operates in close collaboration with the CAGE Research Centre.
The group participates in the CAGE seminar on Applied Economics, which runs weekly on Tuesdays at 2:15pm. Students and faculty members of the group present their ongoing work in two brown bag seminars, held weekly on Tuesdays and Wednesdays at 1pm. Students, in collaboration with faculty members, also organise a bi-weekly reading group in applied econometrics on Thursdays at 1pm. The group organises numerous events throughout the year, including the Research Away Day and several thematic workshops.
Our activities
Work in Progress seminars
Tuesdays and Wednesdays 1-2pm
Students and faculty members of the group present their work in progress in two brown bag seminars. See below for a detailed scheduled of speakers.
Applied Econometrics reading group
Thursdays (bi-weekly) 1-2pm
Organised by students in collaboration with faculty members. See the Events calendar below for further details
People
Academics
Academics associated with the Applied Microeconomics Group are:
Research Students
Events
Wednesday, November 24, 2010
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Rosario MaceraS2.79"Reference-Dependent Social Preferences and the Gift Exchange", Joint with Constanca Esteves-Sorenson This paper develops and tests two models of expectation-based reference-dependent social preferences: reference-dependent altruism and reference-dependent reciprocity. We apply them to a gift-exchange setting to study the importance of the surprising component of a monetary gift in motivating agents. Both models predict that when the agent receives a surprising wage increase his initial effort increases to avoid falling short from his expectations about his own altruistic and reciprocal behavior. In subsequent periods however, as the agent incorporates the wage increase into his expectations, effort decreases. We also explore the case when the principal surprises the agent with a sequence of wage increases. We find that in both models the cost of inducing a steady path of effort is higher when agents have reference-dependent preferences relative to pure-social preferences. To distinguish between models and explore the relationship between negative and positive reciprocity, we further explore the case where the agent anticipates the possibility of a gift. We find that (1) only the reference-dependent reciprocity model predicts reciprocal behavior with certainty (2) negative reciprocity is stronger than positive and increasing in loss aversion. |
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CRETA Seminar Emmanuel Guerre (Queen Mary)S2.79(Queen Mary)
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