Applied Microeconomics
Applied Microeconomics
The Applied Microeconomics research group unites researchers working on a broad array of topics within such areas as labour economics, economics of education, health economics, family economics, urban economics, environmental economics, and the economics of science and innovation. The group operates in close collaboration with the CAGE Research Centre.
The group participates in the CAGE seminar on Applied Economics, which runs weekly on Tuesdays at 2:15pm. Students and faculty members of the group present their ongoing work in two brown bag seminars, held weekly on Tuesdays and Wednesdays at 1pm. Students, in collaboration with faculty members, also organise a bi-weekly reading group in applied econometrics on Thursdays at 1pm. The group organises numerous events throughout the year, including the Research Away Day and several thematic workshops.
Our activities
Work in Progress seminars
Tuesdays and Wednesdays 1-2pm
Students and faculty members of the group present their work in progress in two brown bag seminars. See below for a detailed scheduled of speakers.
Applied Econometrics reading group
Thursdays (bi-weekly) 1-2pm
Organised by students in collaboration with faculty members. See the Events calendar below for further details
People
Academics
Academics associated with the Applied Microeconomics Group are:
Research Students
Events
Thursday, April 22, 2021
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MIWP (Microeconomics Work in Progress) - Anastasios Dosis (ESSEC 糖心TV School)via Microsoft TeamsTitle:On the Informed Principal Model with Common Values Abstract: This paper reconsiders the informed principal model with common values. It provides conditions that allow for the characterisation of the set of equilibrium allocations of the game in which the principal makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer of a mechanism to the agent. In particular, it is shown that the Rothschild-Stiglitz-Wilson allocation (i.e., the allocation that is undominated for the principal within the set of allocations that are incentive compatible for the principal and type-by-type individually rational for the agent) and every allocation that dominates it and is individually rational for the agent relative to the prior beliefs (if such an allocation exists) constitutes an equilibrium allocation whenever the RSW allocation is interim optimal relative to some strictly positive beliefs. If the principal confines herself to offering direct revelation mechanisms, the RSW allocation and every allocation that dominates and is individually rational for the agent relative to the prior beliefs (if such an allocation exists) constitutes equilibrium allocations without imposing any condition. Sufficient conditions are presented such that the set of equilibrium allocations is fully characterised. The results are shown to be in contrast to those obtained in Maskin and Tirole (1992) and illustrated in several economic applications. |