Applied Microeconomics
Applied Microeconomics
The Applied Microeconomics research group unites researchers working on a broad array of topics within such areas as labour economics, economics of education, health economics, family economics, urban economics, environmental economics, and the economics of science and innovation. The group operates in close collaboration with the CAGE Research Centre.
The group participates in the CAGE seminar on Applied Economics, which runs weekly on Tuesdays at 2:15pm. Students and faculty members of the group present their ongoing work in two brown bag seminars, held weekly on Tuesdays and Wednesdays at 1pm. Students, in collaboration with faculty members, also organise a bi-weekly reading group in applied econometrics on Thursdays at 1pm. The group organises numerous events throughout the year, including the Research Away Day and several thematic workshops.
Our activities
Work in Progress seminars
Tuesdays and Wednesdays 1-2pm
Students and faculty members of the group present their work in progress in two brown bag seminars. See below for a detailed scheduled of speakers.
Applied Econometrics reading group
Thursdays (bi-weekly) 1-2pm
Organised by students in collaboration with faculty members. See the Events calendar below for further details
People
Academics
Academics associated with the Applied Microeconomics Group are:
Research Students
Events
Wednesday, October 21, 2026
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Teaching & Learning Seminar - Sambit Bhattacharyya (Sussex)S2.79Title to be advised. |
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Econometrics Seminar - Phil Haile (Yale)Title: |
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CRETA Theory Seminar - Humberto Moreira (FGV EPGE)S2.79Title: Repeated Trade with Divisible Goods (with William Fuchs, Gabriel Gral) Abstract: We study adverse selection in repeated trade with divisible contracts and interdependent values. A privately informed individual sequentially meets short-lived dealers, posts a quantity, and dealers compete on prices after observing the full trading history. We propose a simple believe formation rule and show that, under separation, it is equivalent to D1 in this dynamic setting. The equilibrium is unique, separating and history-dependent. Early on, dynamic incentives amplify the static distortion: anticipating that worse types might mimic them to secure better prices in the future, almost all types scale back quantities relative to the static benchmark. As public history accumulates, the marginal value of additional signalling falls, and allocations move monotonically toward the first-best. As the game horizon lengthens, terminal allocations converge to efficiency. Our work clarifies how quantities and timing interact as signals, showing that repeated trade endogenously weakens the signaling role of retention over time. We illustrate the results in three applications: insurance, financing and the job market. |