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Title: Are two votes better than one? Preference for diversity, representativeness and information

Abstract: We examine theoretically and empirically a novel voting system that has been introduced in Italian local, regional and European elections: second preference voting. In a context of proportional representation with open lists, voters can cast up to two preference votes for candidates to the representative council, one for a male candidate and one for a female. Our theoretical analysis suggests that the new system might achieve better outcomes than a single vote system when voters have a preference for diversity, and they are well informed. Otherwise, few voters will use second votes, compromising the representativeness of the new system. Using administrative data, we estimate that only 20% use their second vote in local elections. We conduct a survey to understand whether the low take-up reflects voters’ preferences or lack of information, finding some support for the latter: 49% of respondents ignored the availability of a 2nd vote. Evidence from Sicily, where the ballot explicitly indicates the possibility of using two votes, suggests that a better design of the ballot might help to increase representativeness of the system and diversity in councils.

Organisers: Apurav Bhatiya, Muhammad Haseeb and Song Yuan

Title of paper: , joint with Ken Hendricks, University of Wisconsin-Madison

Seminar organisers: Sinem Hidir & Costas Cavounidis