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Title: Engaging students during and after lectures

Abstract: Many students are reluctant to engage with the full range of support on offer to them at university. For example, they may avoid interacting with their instructors by not asking questions in lectures and tutorials, and many rarely attend office hours. This is in contrast to their experience before university, e.g. in college or sixth form, where engagement is often higher and student-staff interactions are more common. With much larger student numbers on university courses eLearning technologies are often used to promote engagement and reduce barriers to interactions. In this talk, I reflect on how I have used some of these technologies to enhance student engagement, both during and after lectures, with mixed results. I will then contrast the success of these technologies with changes that I have made to make lecture time more interactive and in-person support more accessible.

Title: "The normalization of extreme parties" (preliminary title)

Catherine will present a paper co-authored with David Alary (Toulouse School of Economics) and Carole Haritchabalet (Universit茅 de Pau) entitled 鈥淥rganizing insurance supply for new and undiversifiable risks鈥�.

The abstract is the following: 鈥淭his paper explores how insurance companies can coordinate to extend their joint capacity for the coverage of new and undiversifiable risks. The undiversifiable nature of such risks causes a shortage of insurance capacity and their limited knowledge makes learning and information sharing necessary. In practice, organizing such insurance supply amounts to sharing a common value divisible good between capacity constrained and privately informed insurers with a reserve price. Widely used ad-hoc co-insurance agreements out to operate as a uniform price auction with an ``exit/re-entry'' option. We compare it to a discriminatory auction, another auction present in the insurance industry. Both auction formats lead to different coverage/premium tradeoffs. If at least one insurer provides an optimistic expertise about the risk, ad-hoc co-insurance agreements offer higher coverage. This result is reversed when all insurers are pessimistic about the risk. Static comparative results with respect to the severity of the capacity constraints and the reserve price are provided. In the case of completely new risks, a regulator aiming at maximizing the expected coverage should promote ad-hoc co-insurance agreements when the reserve price is low enough or when capacity constraints are large enough.鈥�