Applied Microeconomics
Applied Microeconomics
The Applied Microeconomics research group unites researchers working on a broad array of topics within such areas as labour economics, economics of education, health economics, family economics, urban economics, environmental economics, and the economics of science and innovation. The group operates in close collaboration with the CAGE Research Centre.
The group participates in the CAGE seminar on Applied Economics, which runs weekly on Tuesdays at 2:15pm. Students and faculty members of the group present their ongoing work in two brown bag seminars, held weekly on Tuesdays and Wednesdays at 1pm. Students, in collaboration with faculty members, also organise a bi-weekly reading group in applied econometrics on Thursdays at 1pm. The group organises numerous events throughout the year, including the Research Away Day and several thematic workshops.
Our activities
Work in Progress seminars
Tuesdays and Wednesdays 1-2pm
Students and faculty members of the group present their work in progress in two brown bag seminars. See below for a detailed scheduled of speakers.
Applied Econometrics reading group
Thursdays (bi-weekly) 1-2pm
Organised by students in collaboration with faculty members. See the Events calendar below for further details
People
Academics
Academics associated with the Applied Microeconomics Group are:
Research Students
Events
PEPE (Political Economy & Public Economics) Seminar - Monika Nalepa (Chicago)
Title: Modeling self-selection into vetting institutions: An application to purges in nascent democracies
Abstract: Political institutions often produce unintended consequences. Institutions intended to accomplish certain goals can modify incentives of actors in ways that make them depart from the goals the original designers had in mind. Can we use tools of formal modeling to detect when this is likely to happen? In this article, we illustrate such an approach. By combining a simple decision model (a naive reconstruction of an institution) with a costly signaling model, we show how social scientists can incorporate agents鈥� incentives into anticipating downstream effects of vetting institutions. To make our argument legible, we illustrate it with an application to police reform in the context of regime change. Throughout the manuscript, we use the running example of post-communist Poland, a country that faced the daunting challenge of having to reform its police apparatus after communism.