Applied Microeconomics
Applied Microeconomics
The Applied Microeconomics research group unites researchers working on a broad array of topics within such areas as labour economics, economics of education, health economics, family economics, urban economics, environmental economics, and the economics of science and innovation. The group operates in close collaboration with the CAGE Research Centre.
The group participates in the CAGE seminar on Applied Economics, which runs weekly on Tuesdays at 2:15pm. Students and faculty members of the group present their ongoing work in two brown bag seminars, held weekly on Tuesdays and Wednesdays at 1pm. Students, in collaboration with faculty members, also organise a bi-weekly reading group in applied econometrics on Thursdays at 1pm. The group organises numerous events throughout the year, including the Research Away Day and several thematic workshops.
Our activities
Work in Progress seminars
Tuesdays and Wednesdays 1-2pm
Students and faculty members of the group present their work in progress in two brown bag seminars. See below for a detailed scheduled of speakers.
Applied Econometrics reading group
Thursdays (bi-weekly) 1-2pm
Organised by students in collaboration with faculty members. See the Events calendar below for further details
People
Academics
Academics associated with the Applied Microeconomics Group are:
Research Students
Events
MIWP (Microeconomics Work in Progress) Workshop - Shaofei Jiang (Bath)
Title: Persuasion via Sequentially Acquired Evidence
Abstract: I study a sender who can privately acquire and partially disclose hard evidence to persuade a receiver about a binary state of the world. The sender sequentially acquires noisy binary signals. Signals are time-stamped and costly to acquire. When she stops, the sender discloses a left truncation of the signals. That is, it is possible to omit most dated signals. The receiver, uncertain of how many signals the sender acquires, takes an action based on the difference between the number of good and bad signals in the disclosure. If the cost of acquiring each signal is not too high, there are multiple persuasion equilibria. In every equilibrium, the receiver's posterior belief is supported on two points. This is akin to Bayesian persuasion. If full disclosure of signals is mandatory, the game is equivalent to costly Bayesian persuasion. Mandating full disclosure benefits the sender and hurts the receiver.