Applied Microeconomics
Applied Microeconomics
The Applied Microeconomics research group unites researchers working on a broad array of topics within such areas as labour economics, economics of education, health economics, family economics, urban economics, environmental economics, and the economics of science and innovation. The group operates in close collaboration with the CAGE Research Centre.
The group participates in the CAGE seminar on Applied Economics, which runs weekly on Tuesdays at 2:15pm. Students and faculty members of the group present their ongoing work in two brown bag seminars, held weekly on Tuesdays and Wednesdays at 1pm. Students, in collaboration with faculty members, also organise a bi-weekly reading group in applied econometrics on Thursdays at 1pm. The group organises numerous events throughout the year, including the Research Away Day and several thematic workshops.
Our activities
Work in Progress seminars
Tuesdays and Wednesdays 1-2pm
Students and faculty members of the group present their work in progress in two brown bag seminars. See below for a detailed scheduled of speakers.
Applied Econometrics reading group
Thursdays (bi-weekly) 1-2pm
Organised by students in collaboration with faculty members. See the Events calendar below for further details
People
Academics
Academics associated with the Applied Microeconomics Group are:
Research Students
Events
PEPE (Political Economy & Public Economics) Seminar - Sean Gailmard (UC Berkeley)
Title: Political Competition, Migration, and the Quality of Governance in Cities
Authors: Sean Gailmard, John Patty, Christopher Berry
Abstract: Both electoral competition within jurisdictions and geographical competition between them are capable of forcing political representatives to act in the interest of voters. How do these forms of competition interact to affect the quality of governance? We investigate this question theoretically. The model posits that local officials provide governance quality to compete for residents against other jurisdictions, and for votes against other candidates in their jurisdiction. Further, some voters are moderates: they value governance quality but not partisanship of officials. Others are partisans: they value both governance quality and the partisanship of officials. The analysis reveals that geographical and electoral competition can interact to undermine the quality of governance. When partisan representatives govern poorly, voters migrate out. The remaining electorate is both smaller and more partisan. This weakens incentives of political challengers to run for office, thereby promoting incumbents' electoral security.