Applied Microeconomics
Applied Microeconomics
The Applied Microeconomics research group unites researchers working on a broad array of topics within such areas as labour economics, economics of education, health economics, family economics, urban economics, environmental economics, and the economics of science and innovation. The group operates in close collaboration with the CAGE Research Centre.
The group participates in the CAGE seminar on Applied Economics, which runs weekly on Tuesdays at 2:15pm. Students and faculty members of the group present their ongoing work in two brown bag seminars, held weekly on Tuesdays and Wednesdays at 1pm. Students, in collaboration with faculty members, also organise a bi-weekly reading group in applied econometrics on Thursdays at 1pm. The group organises numerous events throughout the year, including the Research Away Day and several thematic workshops.
Our activities
Work in Progress seminars
Tuesdays and Wednesdays 1-2pm
Students and faculty members of the group present their work in progress in two brown bag seminars. See below for a detailed scheduled of speakers.
Applied Econometrics reading group
Thursdays (bi-weekly) 1-2pm
Organised by students in collaboration with faculty members. See the Events calendar below for further details
People
Academics
Academics associated with the Applied Microeconomics Group are:
Research Students
Events
PEPE (Political Economy & Public Economics) Seminar - Livio Di Lonardo (Bocconi)
Title: Repression and Autocratic Consolidation
Abstract - We develop a dynamic model of autocracy where repression suppresses dissent, possibly at the expense of policies that reduce popular discontent—and thus, future mobilization. Accounting for the possibility that repression could hasten or hinder autocratic consolidation, we identify a unique equilibrium that takes one of three forms: deterrence, where the autocrat is never challenged; instability, where challenges occur every period; or a mixed strategy equilibrium with periods of deterrence and periods with challenges. When repression hastens consolidation, the autocrat invests heavily in repression, so as to deter dissent and accelerate the opposition's defeat. When repression bolsters resistance, a tradeoff arises between deterrence and consolidation, and the autocrat may prefer to invite challenges. We then examine the effects of indirect foreign interference - such as sanctions or withholding foreign aid disbursement - aimed at protecting the opposition or promoting democratization. Even under ideal conditions, such interference cannot achieve both goals simultaneously.