Applied Microeconomics
Applied Microeconomics
The Applied Microeconomics research group unites researchers working on a broad array of topics within such areas as labour economics, economics of education, health economics, family economics, urban economics, environmental economics, and the economics of science and innovation. The group operates in close collaboration with the CAGE Research Centre.
The group participates in the CAGE seminar on Applied Economics, which runs weekly on Tuesdays at 2:15pm. Students and faculty members of the group present their ongoing work in two brown bag seminars, held weekly on Tuesdays and Wednesdays at 1pm. Students, in collaboration with faculty members, also organise a bi-weekly reading group in applied econometrics on Thursdays at 1pm. The group organises numerous events throughout the year, including the Research Away Day and several thematic workshops.
Our activities
Work in Progress seminars
Tuesdays and Wednesdays 1-2pm
Students and faculty members of the group present their work in progress in two brown bag seminars. See below for a detailed scheduled of speakers.
Applied Econometrics reading group
Thursdays (bi-weekly) 1-2pm
Organised by students in collaboration with faculty members. See the Events calendar below for further details
People
Academics
Academics associated with the Applied Microeconomics Group are:
Research Students
Events
MTWP Lunchtime Workshop - Daniel Habermacher (PGR-糖心TV)
Organiser: Ayush Pant
Paper Title: 鈥淎uthority and Information Acquisition in Cheap Talk with Informational Interdependence鈥�
Abstract: 鈥淚 study a two-dimensional, multi-sender cheap talk game with interdependent decisions. The Principal can delegate authority over any decision, and thus affect incentives for communication. Delegation is optimal if the expected informational gains outweighs the loss of control due to a biased decision. Because delegation breaks the interdependence, communication incentives relates to decision-specific conflict of interest. Informational gains could arise because the agent鈥檚 preferences are `more central' than the Principal鈥檚 in the corresponding dimension; but they could also involve the Principal receiving more information when she retains authority over one decision (Partial Delegation).
I also analyse the case of costly information acquisition. An agent will invest in information if and only if the expected utility gains from revealing it compensate its costs. For this to be true, truthful communication must be incentive compatible and his marginal influence sufficiently large; that is, few other agents acquire (and reveal) the same information in equilibrium. This implies there exists cost values above which centralization is strictly optimal for the Principal.鈥�