Applied Microeconomics
Applied Microeconomics
The Applied Microeconomics research group unites researchers working on a broad array of topics within such areas as labour economics, economics of education, health economics, family economics, urban economics, environmental economics, and the economics of science and innovation. The group operates in close collaboration with the CAGE Research Centre.
The group participates in the CAGE seminar on Applied Economics, which runs weekly on Tuesdays at 2:15pm. Students and faculty members of the group present their ongoing work in two brown bag seminars, held weekly on Tuesdays and Wednesdays at 1pm. Students, in collaboration with faculty members, also organise a bi-weekly reading group in applied econometrics on Thursdays at 1pm. The group organises numerous events throughout the year, including the Research Away Day and several thematic workshops.
Our activities
Work in Progress seminars
Tuesdays and Wednesdays 1-2pm
Students and faculty members of the group present their work in progress in two brown bag seminars. See below for a detailed scheduled of speakers.
Applied Econometrics reading group
Thursdays (bi-weekly) 1-2pm
Organised by students in collaboration with faculty members. See the Events calendar below for further details
People
Academics
Academics associated with the Applied Microeconomics Group are:
Research Students
Events
CRETA Seminar - Martin Meier (Bath)
This is part of the CRETA Seminar Series, Seminar organisers: Sinem Hidir and Costas Cavounidis.
Abstract of the talk: Perfect Quasi-Perfect Rationalizability (Martin Meier and Andres Perea)
In this paper, we consider backward-induction reasoning in dynamic games, where players only reason about the future, but not the past. Moreover, we assume that players believe that they may make mistakes themselves in the future.
So far, there is no rationalizability concept that allows for this possibility.
Here, we define a rationazability analog of trembling hand perfect equilibrium (THPE) (Selten 1975), which we call trembling hand perfect rationalizability (THPR).
In THPE, as well as in THPR, a player might attribute himself higher mistake probabilities than to others. We consider this as unnatural and overcome this problem by imposing that a player deems his own mistakes infinitely less likely than the combined mistakes of his opponents.
This leads to a concept that we call perfect quasi-perfect rationalizability (PQPR), which by definition, is a refinement of THPR. Blume and Meier (2017) propse, based on the same idea, the concept of perfect quasi-perfect equilibrium, the euqilibrium analog of PQPR.
Asheim and Perea 2005 defined a rationalizability analog of quasi-perfect Equilibrium (QPE), called quasi-perfect rationalizabilibty (QPR). We prove that PQPR is a refinement of QPR.
We also show that PQPR strategies always exist for every player in every finite extensive form game with perfect recall.