Applied Microeconomics
Applied Microeconomics
The Applied Microeconomics research group unites researchers working on a broad array of topics within such areas as labour economics, economics of education, health economics, family economics, urban economics, environmental economics, and the economics of science and innovation. The group operates in close collaboration with the CAGE Research Centre.
The group participates in the CAGE seminar on Applied Economics, which runs weekly on Tuesdays at 2:15pm. Students and faculty members of the group present their ongoing work in two brown bag seminars, held weekly on Tuesdays and Wednesdays at 1pm. Students, in collaboration with faculty members, also organise a bi-weekly reading group in applied econometrics on Thursdays at 1pm. The group organises numerous events throughout the year, including the Research Away Day and several thematic workshops.
Our activities
Work in Progress seminars
Tuesdays and Wednesdays 1-2pm
Students and faculty members of the group present their work in progress in two brown bag seminars. See below for a detailed scheduled of speakers.
Applied Econometrics reading group
Thursdays (bi-weekly) 1-2pm
Organised by students in collaboration with faculty members. See the Events calendar below for further details
People
Academics
Academics associated with the Applied Microeconomics Group are:
Research Students
Events
CRETA Seminar - Larry Samuelson (Yale)
Title: Delegated Bidding
Abstract: We study an interaction in which principals must hire agents
to bid in an auction. The agents can exert unobserved and costly effort
to collect information about the value of the object. The optimal remuneration
scheme must induce the agents to exert effort and then appropriately
condition their bids on their information. The principals thus face
a competing-mechanisms problem with interdependence valuations among
the agents. We identify conditions under which the principals鈥� mechanismchoice
game has a pure equilibrium. We characterize the distortions induced
in the agents鈥� bidding schemes by the principals鈥� efforts to reduce the agents鈥�
rents, and characterize circumstances under which these distortions induce
overbidding.