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Applied Microeconomics

Applied Microeconomics

The Applied Microeconomics research group unites researchers working on a broad array of topics within such areas as labour economics, economics of education, health economics, family economics, urban economics, environmental economics, and the economics of science and innovation. The group operates in close collaboration with the CAGE Research Centre.

The group participates in the CAGE seminar on Applied Economics, which runs weekly on Tuesdays at 2:15pm. Students and faculty members of the group present their ongoing work in two brown bag seminars, held weekly on Tuesdays and Wednesdays at 1pm. Students, in collaboration with faculty members, also organise a bi-weekly reading group in applied econometrics on Thursdays at 1pm. The group organises numerous events throughout the year, including the Research Away Day and several thematic workshops.

Our activities

Work in Progress seminars

Tuesdays and Wednesdays 1-2pm

Students and faculty members of the group present their work in progress in two brown bag seminars. See below for a detailed scheduled of speakers.

Applied Econometrics reading group

Thursdays (bi-weekly) 1-2pm

Organised by students in collaboration with faculty members. See the Events calendar below for further details

People

Academics

Academics associated with the Applied Microeconomics Group are:


Natalia Zinovyeva

Co-ordinator

Manuel Bagues

Deputy Co-ordinator


Events

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Theory workshop

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Location: S2.79
The purpose of this paper is to show that the determination of what is enforceable in a given society and what is not matters for social welfare. In order to achieve this, we present an economy with multiple groups of agents, each one of which faces a hold-up problem. The hold-up would stop to exist if agents could commit not to renegotiate their original agreement, but any private contract with such a clause is not renegotiation-proof. We show that the solution to this problem requires a broader contract between the agents and the enforcement authority, which we call the social contract. We also show that the social contract is renegotiation-proof if it specifies two conditions: i) an economy-wide delegate responsible for the enforcement of the social contract and ii) a set of non-enforceable private contracts
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