Applied Microeconomics
Applied Microeconomics
The Applied Microeconomics research group unites researchers working on a broad array of topics within such areas as labour economics, economics of education, health economics, family economics, urban economics, environmental economics, and the economics of science and innovation. The group operates in close collaboration with the CAGE Research Centre.
The group participates in the CAGE seminar on Applied Economics, which runs weekly on Tuesdays at 2:15pm. Students and faculty members of the group present their ongoing work in two brown bag seminars, held weekly on Tuesdays and Wednesdays at 1pm. Students, in collaboration with faculty members, also organise a bi-weekly reading group in applied econometrics on Thursdays at 1pm. The group organises numerous events throughout the year, including the Research Away Day and several thematic workshops.
Our activities
Work in Progress seminars
Tuesdays and Wednesdays 1-2pm
Students and faculty members of the group present their work in progress in two brown bag seminars. See below for a detailed scheduled of speakers.
Applied Econometrics reading group
Thursdays (bi-weekly) 1-2pm
Organised by students in collaboration with faculty members. See the Events calendar below for further details
People
Academics
Academics associated with the Applied Microeconomics Group are:
Research Students
Events
CRETA Lunchtime Seminar - Willemien Kets (Northwestern)
Willemien Kets (Northwestern) will be presenting as part of the CRETA Seminar series "Robust Multiplicity with a Grain of Naivete"; the paper can be found here: .
The abstract is as follows:
Rationalizability is a central concept in game theory. Since there may be many rationalizable strategies, applications commonly use refi
nements to obtain sharp predictions. In an important paper, Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) show that none of these refi
nements is robust to perturbations of high-order beliefs. We show that robust refi
nements do exist if we relax the assumption that all players are unlimited in their reasoning ability. In particular, for a class of models, every strict Bayesian-Nash equilibrium is robust. A researcher interested in making sharp predictions can thus use intuitive principles or models of players' reasoning to select among the strict equilibria of the game, and these predictions will be robust.