ŠĻą”±į>ž’ §©ž’’’„¦’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’ģ„ĮU@ ųæ3­bjbj¬›¬› %ŹĪńĪńŠ‹Ø’’’’’’ˆāāāāBBBV,FDV“Hź––––¬‡‡‡ż'’'’'’'?>(ė)8ėH$}IRĻKö8HB‡‡‡‡‡8HāŠ²–¬ŪMH»'»'»'‡B¬B¬ż'»'‡ż'»'»'Ń'BBŃ'¬Š P^Öž6iʇØŃ'ż'cH0“HŃ'ÅL/'pÅLŃ'VVāāBBÅLBŃ',»'‡‡‡8H8HVVÄŸ'VVPsychology Moves Towards Whitehead John Pickering Psychology Department ĢĒŠÄTV University, UK. This article deals with a change in how psychology treats cognition. A mechanistic paradigm that has predominated for some decades, has been displaced by one that treats cognition as embodied in organic activity. This change means that Whitehead's metaphysics, and process thought in general, are important for the development of the discipline. From Modern to Postmodern psychology. When modern psychology emerged in the latter part of the nineteenth century, natural science provided both its ontological framework and a methodological ideal. Wundt, Fechner, James and other founding figures envisaged that the new discipline would extend this ideal by the use of phenomenological methods. But with the turn to positivism in the early twentieth century, first behaviourism and most recently Cognitivism came to dominate the discipline. Cognitivism was founded on the assumption that the activity in a nervous system is a form of information processing similar, even identical, to that carried out by a computer. Despite their significant differences, these paradigms shared nineteenth century ontology, a commitment to objective, quantitative data and to reductionism. The assumption was that mental life could, eventually, be completely understood in terms of quantitative methods and a unitary, closed explanatory vocabulary, be it physiology, learning theory or computation. Phenomenological methods, being subjective, qualitative and essentially open and diverse did not fit. They were first marginalised then discarded, partly to identify psychology with an heroic community stretching back to the Enlightenment whose task was the objective investigation, and ultimately the scientific explanation, of mental life. This was the metanarrative of modern psychology. But science no longer has the authority it had in the late nineteenth century and postmodernism has brought a profound skepticism towards metanarratives of such universality. Unfortunately, 'postmodern' is an overstretched term that scientists view with suspicion as being anti-scientific. It has come to be associated with claims that scientific findings are merely social conventions or with the misuse of scientific ideas. However, postmodernism is not anti-scientific at all. In its more constructive forms it provides the means to enrich the resources of science in general and helps release psychology in particular from the impasse of scientism. The impact of postmodernism on psychology has been to diversify both theory and methods. Rather than a single style of inquiry and a unified explanatory vocabulary, it encourages psychologists to broaden the methods and theoretical constructs they use. This challenges the popular image of the scientist as an explorer who finds things in uncharted realms that were there before they were discovered. However, as Rorty, a philosopher with a greater tolerance for postmodernism that most, remarks: " ... many of the things which common sense thinks are found or discovered are in fact made or invented" Accepting this we may in turn accept that the truths psychologists make about mental life will be richer if more diverse conceptual resources are used to make them. Postmodern psychology then, avoids a single theoretical stance and is not reliant on only one style of investigation. However, synthesizing a plurality of views and techniques is not a merely a stylistic option. It is a powerful epistemological gambit, and one that is particularly important for the investigation of consciousness. Consciousness and the Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness. Consciousness has returned to the head of psychology's research agenda, after being ignored for most of the twentieth century. During that time, due to the turn to positivism, subjectivity was assumed to be outside the scope of a properly objective psychology. Consciousness, and human consciousness especially, is indeed the most complex mix of physical, organic and cultural phenomena ever to be the object of scientific investigation. But what that means is that an exclusive commitment to reductionism or operationalism is inappropriate. It would severely restrict what we could discover about consciousness, if positivism were to be the sole epistemological option Fortunately, it is not. In the constructive postmodern spirit, we may not only study consciousness scientifically but also take account of other traditions for knowing the mind. Some of these traditions take phenomenology as their starting point while others treat consciousness as an aspect of organic systems. In organic systems, as Kant pointed out, wholes and parts are hard to distinguish since they are in some important sense 'for' each other. Adapting the vocabulary of Dynamic Systems Theory, we can say that organic systems are emergent, self-creating patterns of causation. These patterns flow dialectically between parts and wholes, reflecting their mutual evolution. Attempting to reduce such systems to isolated components, or dealing merely with particular types of causation, will therefore disclose only a limited range of phenomena. This attempt is still being made in some treatments of consciousness. Cognitivism was one such, being based on a mechanistic metaphor that treated the nervous system as an information processing system akin to a computer. This metaphor has been influential and productive. It has encouraged the building of robots that, it is hoped, may achieve consciousness. It has lead a new confidence that the activity of the nervous system can be fully understood and that there exist neural correlates of consciousness that once isolated and expressed in computational terms will fully explain experience and eliminate the vocabulary of wishes, intentions and feeling in which we describe ordinary experience. This Eliminativist position as it is known, is surely Whitehead's Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness imported into psychology: to mistake abstracted and formalised parts for the unformalisable whole. Cognitivism and Eliminativism are descendants of the mechanistic worldview of Newton & Descartes. However, with the postmodern turn, this worldview is being recast in terms of dynamic patterns of mutual causation and evolving systems of relations. This re-orientates the investigation of mental life towards what Whitehead called "the creative advance of nature". Since creative advance is the essence of experience, this helps psychology to re-engage with the prematurely neglected phenomenological projects of Wundt, Fechner and James. After nearly a century of slumber, psychology is regaining consciousness. The study of cognition is being reclaimed from the computational metaphor which was liberating in the 1950's but became stifling in the 1990's. Subjectivity itself is a major research topic once again. Feeling is now seen as the core of mental life, rather than as a cognitive by-product. For most non-psychologists of course, to propose that feelings are the essence of mental life is little more than common experience. However Western experimental psychology in the twentieth century has not had a great deal of time for common experience. In fact it has been something of a point of principle to show that this or that theoretical construct could 'explain' common experience as something else, something supposedly more fundamental and other than the ordinary stuff of the lived world. But as Husserl warned in the 1930’s, this is to decapitate the science of mental life and to deprive it of its central phenomenon - lived experience. Husserl's critique remains important. Even after Cognitivism displaced Behaviourism, the situation remained essentially the same: experience itself was secondary, something that could be 'explained' once the primary nature of mental activity had been understood. What was primary for Behaviourism were principles of learning that were assumed to be the same for all organisms. What was primary for Cognitivism was the formal principles of computation on which, likewise, were assumed to be the same for all organisms. These formal principles would provide a universal theory of mental life and the nervous system could be understood in terms of the functions it was computing and the representations of the world it used in these computations. Neither Behaviourism nor Cognitivism (nor Eliminativism for that matter) will do as a complete explanation of mental life. Indeed there is no reason to expect that a single, complete, unified theory of mental life can be found. Instead, in line with the postmodern taste for constructive diversity, there is constant critical interaction between theoretical views we may take of it. No single view need be taken as exclusive or predominant. Paradigm Wars. Of course, postmodernism did not invent theoretical diversity. There have always been power struggles to be the predominant paradigm in psychology. Presently, Cognitivism appears to be loosing to connectionism and the dynamic systems approach. Connectionism is a critical response to the implausible claim that formal computational principles could fully capture the essence of mental life. Brains do not appear likely to be computational in the strict sense of being Turing-Machine equivalent. They lack well defined places where information is stored and processed, as the functional architecture set out by Von Neumann requires. As Von Neumann himself noted, nervous systems show densely interconnected neural networks whose activity is far less homogeneous than formal computational theory requires. Connectionism is an attempt to understand this activity from the bottom up, as it were. Models are made of the dense interconnectivity and massively parallel activity of natural nervous systems. These models are networks with inputs from and outputs to their environment. Some of the connectivity of the network is programmed in advance but some is the result of the activity in world around it and on principles of self modification built into the network. In short, the networks can learn and hence become attuned to the objects and events around them. So, while some capacities connectionist systems are specified by the designer, others depend on the history of its encounters with the world around it. These capacities are thus neither a priori nor independently specifiable in formal terms. The behaviour of the system in any encounter is principally a function of past encounters. Not merely in Skinnerian terms, a history of reinforcement but in the more organic sense that states of the world and states of the network are likely to be structurally coupled and related to previous states. This relation is open, not determined, and connectionist systems are not predictable. Indeed it is proposed that more complex ones may even exhibit novel and adaptive responses and thus serve as models of human development. How well connectionism serves as a generalised psychological model is not yet clear since even the largest artificial networks are minute when compared with real nervous systems. Another potential weakness is that connectionist systems are are too powerful. As they are indefinitely modifiable thyey are equivalent to a Turing Machine and hence any psychological phenomenon can, eventually, be reproduced. They thus fail to be interesting by being tautologous. Whether these criticisms prove significant or not, connectionism has already had a significant impact on enduring psychological issues, for example, that of the interaction between nature and nurture More significant here is that any account of the capacity of a connectionist system is necessarily historical. The capacities of networks depend on what has happened to them. This is a fundamental difference from the cognitivist enterprise of abstracting the computational essence of mental life, independent of the contingent particulars of any individual history. Contingency had little role in Cognitivism while it is integral to connectionism. The capacities of a connectionist system reflect the history of that system and the contingent conditions that gave rise to it. Hence the shift from Cognitivism to connectionism is away from the mechanistic and the necessary towards the organic and the contingent. The dynamic systems approach, which is also known as the theory of embodied cognition, is another critical response to the claim that nervous system activity can be expressed in a universal computational formalism. The objection is that such activity cannot be independent of the system in which it is expressed. Instead the nervous system is taken to be engaged in a unique, cyclic process of adjustment to the flow of action in which organisms participate. Since different organisms have fundamentally different morphologies and act in fundamentally different ways, this flow will be accordingly very different. Rather than treating nervous systems as if they performed essentially similar, and hence formalisable operations, the dynamic approach treats them as vehicles for unique patterns of activity. These patterns extend beyond the organism to reflect the particular conditions in which the activity occurs and the relationship the organism has with those conditions. The activity of the whole system is a form of sensitive chaos in which some patterns of activity tend to repeat. These patterns, called attractors, are the memory of the system. This memory, however, is not detachable from the present state of the system nor from the history of interaction with the world around it. Although attractors are recurrent each recurrence will reflect the conditions, both external and internal, that obtain at the time of recurrence. Connectionism and Dynamic Systems Theory are both critical responses to the mechanistic metaphor implicit in Cognitivism. Details need not concern us here. However, what is interesting about these paradigm wars for the present argument is that the winning contestants are reflect a postmodern shift away from the Newtonian-Cartesian world picture. We are moving towards one in which living systems are no longer special cases. It is this that makes postmodern psychology Whiteheadian. Postmodern Psychology is Whiteheadian. Here, what is meant by 'Whiteheadian' will be simplified to mean the picture of reality presented in Modes of Thought. Of course, this does not fully reflect the depth and details of Whitehead's philosophy, but, as Whitehead says in the preface, the book helped him to condense the essentials of public lectures given at Harvard and Chicago over 1934 - 1938. These, being among his last attempt to present the core of his views to non-specialists, must provide something of a summa. The essentials of this picture are: 1. The ultimate constituents of reality are experiences that participate in the creative advance of nature. 2. These experiences are prehensions, that is, the active transition from one state of knowing to another, guided by aim and purpose. 3. Prehensions interpenetrate each other and hence are continuous in time and space - there are no gaps or 'idle wheels' in nature. 4. Hence abstraction, especially in the form of space-like and time-like separation of objects or events gives only a limited picture of reality. Such a picture could have had no significance for a psychology dominated by Cognitivism which, like the paradigms preceding it, inherited the mechanistic metaphysics of the late nineteenth century. This was that 'reality' was insensate matter whose activity was governed by time invariant physical laws. It was thus feelingless and lacked any sense of experienced duration. Accordingly, the structure of experience and indeed its very existence, required some special explanation. Kantian a priorism, Dualism or some variety of supernaturalism were among the alternatives. James, for example, was content to accept the idea of a soul as the bearer of human experience. Philosophers inclined to a broadly organic view, such as Bergson and Whitehead, responded more critically. Bergson identified human experience as part of a progressive life-force, working against the tendency of matter to sink into inert simplicity and driving it upward into greater complexity and higher levels of organic sensitivity. Whitehead, although commending Bergson in his Concept of Nature (Ch. 3), does not identify experience with any force apart from the material world. Experience is inside reality, not outside it. Such a panpsychic metaphysics, that puts experience at the heart of an indivisible reality, is incompatible with mechanistic metaphors for mental life. Mechanism means a complex assembly with parts that can be isolated from the whole and still retain meaning. Computers, for example, are machines in just this sense. Moreover the idea that they might be capable of experience seems absurd since they have no interiority, no 'view from within' although this is sometimes dismissed as mere bio-chauvinism. Advances in artificial intelligence and artificial life, it is claimed, will show that machines too can express the 'logical form of life' as one advocate puts it. While intriguing, these projects do not at the moment seem likely to preserve mechanism as the metaphysics of psychology. Machines that have wants feelings and sensation remain fictions, albeit fictions in which there is increasing interest as artificial intelligence and artificial life forms become more sophisticated. In any case, modern psychology, in common with most of science, claims to avoid metaphysics. Most contemporary psychologists would probably find Whitehead too speculative to be of practical relevance. But metaphysics is unavoidable, as noted by the biologist Conrad Waddington and the physicist David Bohm. Both, acknowledging a debt to Whitehead, independently recognised that even scientists who denied making metaphysical assumptions did just that in the course of conventional scientific inquiry. Moreover, they both noted that these implicit assumptions were the more significant just because they were denied. Since they precondition what scientist think they are 'discovering' in reality it is vital to be aware of them. We might illustrate this point by a brief review of models of perception and memory as they have developed over the Cognitivist era. Books that helped to inaugurate the era like Cognitive Psychology, by Neisser or Human Information Processing by Lindsay & Norman and articles on long and short term memory by Waugh & Norman and by Atkinson & Shiffrin. In these and in contemporary publications, numerous diagrams appeared showing the stages of information processing that were supposed to be occurring in the minds of people as they recognised objects and events, laid down memories and subsequently recalled them. These diagrams all had the characteristic that Neisser was subsequently, and dismissively to call 'Naive Seriality'. That is, they assumed that activity in the nervous system was in essence like that a production line. Raw materials entered, were elaborated, stored and eventually retrieved and used to produce outputs. The mechanistic implications of such diagrams had empirical consequences. For example, there is little purpose in trying to show that early stages of sensory processing could be directly influenced later ones or by stored information, since the naive seriality of the diagrams ruled it out. In fact, in time, such influences have been found. Neuroanatomical evidence too is subject to selective emphasis. For example, most textbooks stress how neurons in the major sensory tracts transmit neural activity to the brain, as indeed they do. But fewer textbooks also note that a proportion of the neurons transmit activity in the opposite direction. Some attention has been paid to this activity from time to time, although what role it plays is not clear. What is clear is that were the early information processing diagrams to be taken as literal guides to neural activity, the role of these centrifugal neurons might remain unexamined. The early diagrams then were symptomatic of a reductive view of mental life. One might ask, what in everyday experience appeared to correspond to them? There were some correspondences to be sure. For example, a number of short-term memory models incorporate an internal verbal rehearsal loop in which material to be remembered could be preserved. This corresponds well with what we actually experience when, for example trying to preserve a telephone number prior to dialing it or writing it down. However, this is a thin selection from the richer array of everyday phenomenology, lacking any sense of emotional tone, strategy or effort. Models presently used in the field are restricted to this prosaic level of mental life, principally in the interest of making them suitable for strict laboratory testing. The assumption is that there will exist some level at which all human mental life is the same, conforming to context-independent laws of mental operation dictated by the functional constraints of an information processing system that is universal. This reductive denaturing of mental life in order to make it suitable for a particular style of experimental investigation and the theoretical vocabulary that comes with it. This is surely something that Whitehead would have recognised as a variety and consequence of misplaced concreteness. However, there is change. More recent diagrams make an interesting contrast. They present a broader vista of mental life and support a correspondingly richer phenomenology. No longer do we find neatly labeled boxes with well-defined pathways along which mental activity passes, much as products might pass from one processing stage to another. Instead of boxes, we find descriptions of mental activity and content at a far broader, macroscopic level. Instead of unidirectional pathways we find recurrent loops or bi-directional arrows indicating co-ordinated activity rather than simple transfer. The whole effect is to describe, in terms that are reminiscent of dynamic systems theory, how organisms maintain a dynamic balance between a constantly changing environment and a correspondingly changeable pattern of neural activity. This activity is not merely the passing of messages from one place to another, but the functional integration of various subsystems to do with perceiving, planning acting and monitoring. This activity reflects both what the environment affords and what the organism is doing or intending to do. The author of one such diagram, which deals with the pattern of activity in the sensory cortex, adds this description it: "The emergent pattern is not a representation of a stimulus ... It is a state transition that creates and carries the meaning of the stimulus for the subject. It reflects the individual history, present context, and expectancy, corresponding to the unity and wholeness of intentionality. Owing to the dependence on history, the patterns created in each cortex are unique to each subject.". There are suggestive resemblances here to Whitehead's description of how prehensions participate in the creative advance of nature. For example, prehensions are unique; they interpenetrate, they are transitions that carry meaning and they are intentional. All the elements are present in the description above. The description, and the diagrams similar to it accordingly, are compatible with a richer and more realistic phenomenology. The chang in psychological diagrams has only been sketched here, but it is clearly in a direction that promises to make psychology at least more compatible with Whiteheadian metaphysics. The movement from Cognitivism towards Connectionism, the Dynamic Systems approach and 'Embodied' treatments of cognition has something of the same character. Central to this movement the idea of 'causal spread'. That is, what renders mental life and activity coherent is not sought by in one place or level of a system. Instead, the causal structure responsible is assumed to be spread over the entire system, rendering such boundaries as, mental/physical, mind/body, organism/environment, perceptual/motor, innate/learned more permeable and flexible than hitherto. For example, recent discussions of evolution, genetics and development avoids treating genes as if they were separate, detachable and independently re-assortable packets of information and likewise avoids treating the environment as presenting a static array of affordances that pre-dated the organism. There are no " ... no pre-existing representations or instructions that shape organisms from within, there are no preexisting niches or environmental problems that shape population from without ". Instead, in the language of Dynamic Systems Theory, organisms are treated as self-constructing systems that arise and persist amid cycles of contingency. Here, Whitehead's remark that "genes are not self contained" MOT 189 is striking. Especially given that it is presented as a logical entailment of his wider worldview rather than as a discussion of biology per se. This questioning of boundaries and of the possibility of finding separable parts in organic wholes applies both to physical and functional boundaries. For example, with the move away from strict Cognitivism, the division between the perceptual and motor systems has been questioned in a fundamental way. Hurley questions what she terms the "classical sandwich" assumption found in psychology and philosophy. This assumes the motor and the perceptual systems as separate and enclose a central mental arena in which cognition and experience are organised. Instead, she suggests that activity in the perceptual and motor systems are integrated and inseparable. This is a more fundamental integration than, for example, the re-afferent canceling in which we avoid mistaking the movement of the eyes as movement in the world. Instead, the claim is that what we perceive is actually the result of integrating sensory information about the structure of the environment with motor information about possible actions related to that structure. The two system interpenetrate and are mutually constitutive. The autopoietic theory of Maturana & Varela is a similar proposal over a longer evolutionary timescale.  Their view of organisms is that they are dynamic unities which maintain themselves by actively internalising the structure of the environment. Cognition is embodied in living beings, it is inseparable from particular conditions of activity. These condiions are in turn the product of an evolutionary history in which feeling has had a formative role. Over this history the internal milieu of the organism becomes structurally coupled to the environment in which that organism is best fitted to act. Perception, in their view, requires the active involvement of the perceiver in a self-maintaining pattern of circular causality. The world as perceived is not merely passively encountered, but actively made through the purposive activity of the organism. In their view, as with Hurley, the perceptual system cannot be considered apart from action. It is unrealistic to treat it as if it were merely a collection of processing stages which can be removed from the whole and still be meaningfully interpretable. Work such as that of Hurley and of Maturana and Varela exposes the limitations of strict Cognitivism in very much the same spirit, and indeed in something of the same way, that Dewey criticised the simple reflexology of his day. They all take as their starting point the fact, known to us through direct experience, that organisms are autonomous actor-perceivers. As Kauffman puts it: "living entities … manipulate the world on their own behalf'. To do so, they detect in their surroundings that which is needed for that action. The resemblance to Whitehead's notion of prehensions guided by aim and purpose is clear. The resemblance is more than superficial and has practical consequences. Take as an example the planning and production of actions in robotics. Under some of the early and stricter forms of Cognitivism this was interpreted as the execution of an inner plan, rather like a computer programme. Indeed, some early robots were built on just this assumption. Contemporary robots are very different. Their intelligence is action-based. There far fewer internal planning operations and instead the robot has more biologically plausible internal centres of activity which cause it to wander about, interact with objects, monitor its internal states, use sensory systems and so on. These centres of activity interact with each other and with information from the environment in a condition of productive chaos from which organised and apparently purposive actions emerge. In line with the proposal of causal spread, there is no unitary causal centre or agency responsible for this organisation however. Causal spread can stand as a surface manifestation of a deeper and more fundamental paradigm shift. Put in broader terms, this shift is one result of biologists and psychologists attempting to trace the causal network supporting living organisation down to finer and more pervasive levels of reality. It is becoming apparent, as Kauffman puts it, that: " ... much of the order in organisms ... is self-organised and spontaneous". Now, as Whitehead famously remarked, "Biology is the science of large organisms, while physics is the science of small ones" (SMW. Page 97). For Kauffman and others who are seeking the principles underlying living organisation, and in the process questioning its reducibility, the question then is: how far can this re-animation of nature be taken? One answer, following the return of interest in consciousness as an object of scientific research, is some form of panpsychism. In order to properly approach the fact of experience in ourselves, we will need to recognise Whitehead's obsevation that 'not all experience is conscious' i.e. that it is not a human monopoly. This is a commonplace proposal to those who attribute graded forms of consciousness to animals, but to extend it to panpsychism is a significant shift in the Western worldview. Whitehead's project was precisely that, a re-orientation of Western thought towards a view of the universe as essentially living rather than dead. The experience of which we as human beings can become aware is the tip of an iceberg which is sentient all the way down. Something similar to this re-orientation is to be seen in the work of some psychologists, philosophers and physicists who, although working independently, are nonetheless moving towards the same conclusion: that in order for scientific theories to be more complete and less self-contradictory, consciousness will need to be taken as a primordial property of reality. What is in process here is a change in our scientific worldview in which, "With qualities and feelings as essential aspects of science, it will be possible to proceed with Whitehead's presciently postmodern programme of bringing together the insights of science with others from religious and artistic traditions.  If psychology is to play the role in this change that it should play, some engagement with Whitehead will be helpful, if not essential. Conclusion. The changes in psychology that have been sketched here are surface manifestations of a deeper metaphysical change. This change also signals a paradigm shift in a Whiteheadian direction, given that paradigm shifts actually start with metaphysics. As this shift unfolds we may expect that psychology, operating within a more organic framework and using the more open methodological repertoire supported by constructive postmodernism, will be able to avoid the reduction of mental life and the marginalisation of phenomenology that have been among the restrictive entailments of preceding mechanistic paradigms. It is in this sense that psychology is central to the emergence of postmodern science. Within the postmodern framework, no single theoretical stance or philosophical framework is final, including Whitehead's. To the extent that his metaphysical system is Platonic and static, it fails to meet the more pragmatic epistemological conditions of the early twenty first century. Instead, Whitehead will be but one voice in the more diverse dialogue that constitutes postmodern psychology and philosophy. This is not to devalue or dismiss Whitehead, but instead to extend the analytic tradition that has been the implicit philosophical framework of psychology for over a century. For example, philosophers in the lineage of Bergson, such as Merleau-Ponty, Serres and Deleuze, who treat mental life as situated at the junction of the human and pre-human orders, have much in common with the systems approach to evolution and development. The shift towards Whitehead may help to provide a broader, more varied and hence more stable basis for science of mental life. This can only help to advance and enrich the study of experience and its place in the world. It may also help to bring out some implicit value assumptions that psychology inherits by adopting nineteenth century science as its implicit model. For example, that the purpose of scientific inquiry is to provide the means to manipulate the world more effectively in service of human interests. If, under this view, we treat the mind as if it were merely some form of mechanism, it will encourage the search for techniques that indeed manipulate and constrain mental life into mechanistic patterns. Of course, advertising and propaganda do this effective already, without scientific metaphors or metaphysics. Nonetheless, metaphysical assumptions have consequences. And the more implicit or denied those assumptions are, the more important are the consequences. Presently however, metaphysics is a dismissive label for what is taken to be irresolvable speculation. As such it is judged to be irrelevant to psychology. But psychology under Cognitivism does not lack a metaphysics, it merely operates an outdated system without realising or acknowledging it. We can do better. Following Whitehead, psychologists and others who study mental life can re-orient their treatment of it. Rather than taking it to be the operation of a mechanism that within a world devoid of meaning or experience, it is possible to treat it, more naturally, as an aspect of the activity of organisms who engage with a world that shares in a universal capacity for experience. As David Bohm puts it: " Postmodern science should not separate matter and consciousness and should therefore not separate facts, meaning and value. Science would then be inseparable from a kind of intrinsic morality, and truth and virtue would not be kept apart, as they currently are in science." The study of cognition is moving on from a mechanistic metaphor and the claim that mental life, including experience, can be broken down into parts like a machine. This fragmentation of our sense of being experientially whole is being repaired. As one philosopher puts it in criticising contemporary psychology, we are in the process of "putting ourselves together again".  Mazlish,B. The Fourth Discontinuity: The Co-Evolution of Humans and Machines. Yale Univesity Press,1993. Pages 109 & 172.  Horgan, J. The End of Science: Facing the Limits of Knowledge in the Twilight of the Scientific Age. Addison-Wesley, 1998. Lyotard, J-F. The Postmodern Condition: A Report On Knowledge. Manchester University Press. 1984.  Sokal, A. & Bricmont, J. Intellectual Impostures: Postmodern Philosophers' Abuse Of Science. London:Profile,1998. (Originally: Impostures intellectuelles, Éditions Odile Jacob, 1997. )  Griffin, D. (1988) Introduction. In Griffin, D. (Ed.) The Reenchantment of Science: Postmodern Proposals. State University of New York Press, Albany. Clarke, C. (1996) Reality Through the Looking Glass: Science and Awareness in the Postmodern World. Floris Books, Edinburgh.  Kvale, S. (1992) (Ed.) Psychology and Postmodernism. Sage, London. See especially: 'Towards a Postmodern Psychology" by Gergen, K.  Rorty, R. Philosophy and Social Hope. Penguin, 1999. Page xvii.  Churchland,P. Neurophilosophy :Toward A Unified Science Of The Mind-Brain. MIT Press. 1986 Churchland, P.M. and Churchland, P. S. On The Contrary :Critical Essays, 1987-1997. MIT Press,1998.  Gare, A. Speculative Metaphysics and the Future of Phiolosophy: The Contemporary Relevance of Whitehead's Defence of Speculative Metaphysics. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1999, Vol. 77 (2): 127 - 145. Rescher, N. Process Metaphysics : An Introduction To Process Philosophy. State University of New York Press, 1996. Rescher, N. Process Philosophy : A Survey Of Basic Issues. University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000.  Griffin, D. Unsnarling The World-Knot : Consciousness, Freedom, And The Mind-Body Problem. University of California Press, 1998.  Nunez, R. & Freeman, W. (1999) Reclaiming Cognition: The Primacy Of Action, Intention & Emotion. Imprint Academic, Exeter, UK. (This is Volume 6, No.s 11 - 12 of Journal of Consciousness Studies.)  Varela, F. & Shear, J. (Ed.s) The View From Within :First-Person Approaches To The Study Of Consciousness. Imprint Academic. 1999. (This is Journal Of Consciousness Studies, 1999, Vol 6, no.s 2-3)  Damasio, A. Descartes' Error : Emotion, Reason And The Human Brain. Papermac, 1996 Damasio, A. The Feeling Of What Happens : Body And Emotion In The Making Of Consciousnes. Heinemann, 2000.  Newell, A. Unified Theories of Cognition. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 1991. Gardner, H. The Mind's New Science : A History Of The Cognitive Revolution. Basic Books, 1985. Page 6.  Johnson-Laird, P. A computational analysis of consciousness. In Marcel, A. and Bisiach, E. (Eds.) Consciousness In Contemporary Science. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 1988.  Bates, E. et al. Innateness and Emergentism. In A Companion To Cognitive Science. Edited by Bechtel, W. & Graham, G. Blackwell, 1998  Langton, C. (Ed.) Artificial Life : An Overview. MIT Press, 1995.  "Metaphysics is something that pervades every field, that conditions each person’s thinking in varied & subtle ways, of which we are not conscious. ..... everybody has got some kind of metaphysics, even if he thinks he hasn’t .... the practical hard-headed individual has a very dangerous kind of of metaphysics, i.e. the kind of which he is unaware. ... such metaphysics is dangerous because in it assumptions and inferences are being mistaken for directly observed facts, with the result that they are effectively riveted in an almost unchangeable way into the structure of thought." David Bohm, “Further Remarks on Order,” in Towards a Theoretical Biology, ed. C. H. Waddington. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1968, p. 41. See also the opening chapters of Waddington, C. Tools For Thought. Jonathan Cape, 1977.  Freeman, W. Consciousness, Intentionality and Causality, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 1999, Vol. 6, no.s 11 - 12, page 150.  Freeman, W. 1999, ibid.  Haugeland, J. Mind Embodied and Embedded. In Having Thought : Essays In The Metaphysics Of Mind. Edited by Haugeland, J.. Harvard University Press, 1998. Clark, A. Mindware: An Introduction To The Philosophy Of Cognitive Science. Oxford University Press, London. 2001. Varela, F., Thompson, E. & Rosch, E. The Embodied Mind. MIT Press:London. 1991  Wheeler, M. & Clark, A. Genic Representation: Reconciling Content and Causal Complexity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 50, 1999, 103-135.  Oyama, S. et al. What is Developmental Systems Theory? In Cycles Of Contingency: Developmental Systems And Evolution. Edited by Oyama, S., Griffiths, P. & Gray, R. MIT Press 2001, page 6  Hurley, S. Consciousness in Action. Harvard University Press, 1998.  Maturana, U. & Varela, F. The Tree of Knowledge: the Biological Roots of Human Understanding. Shambala, Boston. 1987.  Dewey, J. The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology. Psychological Review, 1896, Vol. 3, 357-370.  HYPERLINK http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Dewey/reflex.htm http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Dewey/reflex.htm  Kauffman, S. Illuminations. Oxford University Press, 2000. Page 2.  Kauffman, S. ibid.  Reber, A. Caterpillars & Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology, 1996, 10(4): 437-449. Chalmers, D. The Conscious Mind: In Search Of A Fundamental Theory. Oxford University Press. 1996 Page 357. Penrose, R. The Large, the Small and the Human Mind. Cambridge University Press, 1997. Page 176.  Goodwin, B. Reclaiming a Life of Quality. Journal of Consiousness Studies, 1999, Vol. 6, No.s 11 - 12, page 235)  Koyré, A. The significance of the Newtonian Synthesis. In Newtonian Studies, University of Chicago Press, 1950. Page 6. See also Gare, A. ibid. page 128.  Ingold, T. From Complementarity To Obviation: On Dissolving The Boundaries Between Social And Biological Anthroppology, Archaeology And Psychology. In Cycles Of Contingency: Developmental Systems And Evolution. Edited by Oyama, S., Griffiths, P. & Gray, R. MIT Press 2001, page 255.  Bohm, D. Postmodern Science and a Postmodern World. In Griffin, D. R. (Ed.) The Reenchantment of Science, Postmodern Proposals. State University of New York Press, Albany. 1988.  Freeman, W. & Nunez, R. Restoring to cognition the forgotten primacy of action, intention and emotion. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 1999, Vol. 6, No.s 11 - 12, pages ix - xix.  Midgely, M. Putting Ourselves Together Again. In Consciousness And Human Identity. Edited by Cornwell, J. Oxford University Press, 1998. #Ę ė Œ  JKåģūü_`Z“[\"!#!™!š!,#-#h#i#Į#Ā#O%]%\(](@)A)++66‰@Æ@A&AB–B·FĮFķHžH%L&LLPMPQQ'QDQO]P]xcycfŽf2g3g$j%j”kšk:m;m^p_pAuBu"v#vv|w|K‚L‚ŒƒųōķōćōćōćōćōÜōćōćōķōćōćōćōćōćōćōÜōćōćōķōćōķōÜōÜōÜōÜōćōćōÜōÜōćōćōćōćōćōÜōćōćōćōćōćōćō hV6]jhV0JU hV5\hVhVCJ(aJ(T#$%4JbcdeÅ Ę ģ ķ f g fg  YZ“”9ööööööööšäääääääääääääääää $„ā’dh]„ā’a$„’]„’$„’]„’a$Š“2­žž9:™š( ) O"P"Ć#Ä#S&T&B)C)++++ ,,x0y0~33Q5R5ļ8š8<óóóóóóóóóóóóóóóóóóóóóóóóóóóó $„ā’dh]„ā’a$<<>ž>ˆ@‰@°@±@—B˜B¼B½B)CÆC3DÅDĘDAFBF„I…ImMnMNPOPžS’Sóóóóóóóóóóóććććóóóóóóóóóóó$ Ęh„ā’dh]„ā’a$ $„ā’dh]„ā’a$’S±W²W]]zc{cļeše,h-h k”kõoöo[t\tŃvŅvæzĄz×}Ų}ĪĻR‚S‚„„óóóóóóóóóóóóóóóóóóóóóóóóóóóó $„ā’dh]„ā’a$ŒƒƒŽƒ„%„… …7Š8Š2DEOuw ’ ’ ’ ’³’“’‡“ˆ“Š“‹“˜“Ł“ ” ” ””q”›”Ź”š”ń”ņ”•P•u••®•Æ•°•é•–^–Æ–É–Ź–Ė–ä–—P—Q—R—_—y—•—–———§—ā—˜F˜W˜X˜Y˜ģ˜™;™v™Æ™Ü™śšģåģšģšģįģįģįģŚģšģšģšģĢĹÄģĢĹĹÄģĢĹĹÄģĢĹĹÄģĢĹÄģĢĹÄģĢĹĹÄģĢĹĹĹhV6CJ]aJhVCJaJjhV0JCJUaJ hV6]hßŲ hV5\hVjhV0JU hV0JI„'„(„ē†č†‹‹OP‰“Š““ ” ”Œ”ń”ō”Æ•²•L–Ź–Ķ–Q—T—–—óóóóóóóóóóóóåååååååßßßåååå„É]„É „É„n„’ū]„É^„n`„’ū $„ā’dh]„ā’a$–—™—ō—X˜[˜.™¢™šš‰šR›U›œ!œvœćœęœ>§Ŗ^žažēžźž.Ÿ0ŸńńńńńńńąąńńńńńńńńŚńńńńńńń„É]„É„„„šńdh]„^„`„šń „É„n„’ū]„É^„n`„’ūܙššš‰šŠšŖšźš/›O›Q›R›S›t›Ć›å›œœœœ.œdœƒœĻœāœćœäœńœK‰¦§Øž4ž]ž^ž_ž‘ž“žęžēžčžżžŸ-Ÿ.Ÿ/ŸÆ”Ģ”D¢U¢m¢n¢o¢«¢Ė¢ņ¢ó¢ō¢£ £££@£r£»£ž£K¤]¤u¤v¤w¤Ó¤„„„T„Ž„Ö„ųōźōÜųŃųŃųōÜųŃųŃųōÜųŃųŃųōÜųŃųŃųōÜųŃųōÜųŃųōÜųŃųōÜųŃųŃųōÜųŃųōźōŹōÜųŃųŃųŃųōźōŹōÜųŃų hV6]hV6CJ]aJjhV0JCJUaJjhV0JUhVhVCJaJP0Ÿ„”¢¢m¢n¢q¢ó¢ö¢££°£%¤v¤y¤„„ׄŚ„ ¦#¦œ¦Ÿ¦ž¦k§łłėėėėėŻŻėłėė××ėėėėėėėÕė„ ]„  „É„n„’ū]„É^„n`„’ū „É„n„’ū]„É^„n`„’ū„É]„ÉքׄŲ„ę„ż„¦ ¦!¦?¦„¦›¦œ¦¦Ÿ¦Ń¦å¦ž¦’¦9§:§;§i§j§k§l§m§}§Š§²§³§“§É§Ź§Ė§õ§ Ø3ØhØ ØĒØŽØöØ÷ØųØ&©F©l©m©n©¬©½© Ŗ ŖŖ©ŖćŖ.«/«0««³«ę«ē«č«S¬s¬ ¬üīęŪęüīęŪęüīęüŌüČę½Č³ČęüīęŪęüīęüīęŪęŪęŪę©üīęŪęüīęŪęüīęŪęüīęŪęüīęŪęhV0JCJaJhV0JCJaJjh@9ÖUjhVCJUaJ hV6]hV6CJ]aJhVCJaJjhV0JCJUaJhVBk§l§o§³§¶§Ź§Ķ§&ؓØ÷ØśØm©p©ė© ŖŖ/«2«ē«ź«”¬¤¬1­2­3­ńńńńńńńńńńńńńńńńńńńńńńļć $„ā’dh]„ā’a$ „É„n„’ū]„É^„n`„’ū ¬”¬¢¬×¬÷¬0­1­2­3­üīęŪęü×ühßŲhV6CJ]aJhVCJaJjhV0JCJUaJhV# 0P°|. °ČA!°Š"°Š#Š$Š%°3DŠÉźyłŗĪŒ‚ŖK© /http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Dewey/reflex.htmąÉźyłŗĪŒ‚ŖK© ^http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Dewey/reflex.htmœR@ń’R Normal7$8$$CJOJQJ^J_HaJmH sH tH DA@ņ’”D Default Paragraph FontRi@ó’³R  Table Normalö4Ö l4Öaö (k@ō’Į(No List <+@ņ<  Endnote TextCJaJ>*@¢> Endnote ReferenceH*>@>  Footnote TextCJaJ@&¢!@ Footnote ReferenceH*6U@¢16 Hyperlink >*B*ph’4 @B4 Footer  ĘąĄ!.)@¢Q. Page NumberŒ J ū _ ["™,hĮ\ @!.%DLHOUx[^2_$b:e^hAm"nvtKz{}7‚ Š³Š‡‹3„€g%@Ē Ī{’Č”Y  Ō ] ¤ äi„ģ‹M–ā)@mćƒ„]§Ŗ3„Ź’’’’#$%4JbcdeÅĘģķfgfg  YZ“”9:™š()OPĆÄSTB!C!#### $$x(y(~++Q-R-ļ0š0446ž6ˆ8‰8°8±8—:˜:¼:½:);Æ;3<Å<Ę<A>B>„A…AmEnENHOHžK’K±O²OUUz[{[ļ]š],`-` c”cõgög[l\lŃnŅnærĄr×uŲuĪwĻwRzSz||'|(|ē~č~ƒƒ……O‡P‡‰‹Š‹‹ Œ ŒŒŒńŒōŒÆ²LŽŹŽĶŽQT–™ōX[.‘¢‘’’‰’R“U“”!”v”ć”ę”>•§•Ŗ•^–a–ē–ź–.—0—„™ššmšnšqšóšöš››°›%œvœyœ×Ś ž#žœžŸžžžkŸlŸoŸ³Ÿ¶ŸŹŸĶŸ& “ ÷ ś m”p”ė” ¢¢/£2£ē£ź£”¤¤¤1„4„˜0€€˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€˜0€€(˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€x˜0€€˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€@˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€`˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€x˜0€€˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€˜0€€˜0€€€˜0€€x˜0€€x˜0€€x˜@0€€ų€˜@0€€x˜@0€€ų€˜@0€€x˜@0€€x˜@0€€ų€˜@0€€˜@0€€ų€˜@0€€x˜@0€€˜@0€€ų€˜@0€€x˜@0€€ų€˜@0€€x˜@0€€˜@0€€x˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€x˜@0€€ų€˜@0€€ų€˜@0€€˜@0€€ų€˜@0€€x˜@0€€˜@0€€ų€˜@0€€x˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€x˜@0€€˜@0€€x˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€x˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€ €˜@0€€˜@0€€ €˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€ų€˜@0€€x˜@0€€ų€˜@0€€x˜@0€€ų€˜@0€€˜@0€€ų€˜@0€€x˜@0€€ų€˜@0€€x˜@0€€x˜@0€€x˜@0€€ų€˜@0€€x˜@0€€ų€˜@0€€˜@0€€ų€˜@0€€˜@0€€x˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€˜@0€€.VŒƒÜ™Ö„ ¬3­W]`bd9<’S„–—0Ÿk§3­XZ[\^_ac2­Yt°ßŖX”’•„š8š@ń’’’€€€÷š’šš0š( š ššB šS šæĖ’ ?šįéSkĘė“æ‘æ Ź Z’«ė•ūƒ‰’ Yfœ«q~ąį##Q,c,»-Ņ-•00E1J1¢3Ŗ3Ģ5Ļ5°7ŗ7D=P=>‰>·>Į>ĖFŪFłHIœX«X>ZNZv[x[ \\»\Ē\^Å^lara=e†e½gĆgiiŒl›l›mŖmźmõm€ooTsbsütu¹wĖw|&|³ƒF„…†…õ…ö…!†3†–† †ń†ž†ųˆ‰Š)Šw‹‹Š‹”‹–‹š‹õ‹ł‹ ŒtŒ‰ŒŒŒ™Œ¾ŒĄŒĶŒéŒōŒ FHXe«®ŽIŽfŽmŽ±ŽÉŽĶŽ_z{‰‹•£„äīō"4QV[c.‘9‘C‘P‘x‘”‘¢‘­‘·‘Ć‘ß‘’’’)’/’c’ˆ’Ģ’Ī’q“w“!”,”9”@”v””—” ”Ņ”ā”ꔕ>•I•Z•c•Œ•ž•Ÿ•¦•Ŗ•»•½•ē•––a–––Ÿ–ś–——-—^—i—Ķ—Ö—˜"˜˜”˜JšMšöš ›<›F›Š›››®›°›¹›Õ›×›%œIœKœ]œhœoœyœœ(¼½Śäęžžž#ž<žŖžĻžoŸ{Ÿ}Ÿ‹ŸŒŸŖŸ«Ÿ²Ÿ¶ŸĀŸĶŸōŸ& 2 Q S k ƒ „ ’ ć ź ķ ö ”$”p”y”{”§”©”į”攟”¢¢££2£:£=£g££„£µ£ą£ź£¤¤Q¤¤¤Æ¤±¤Ņ¤å¤č¤ś¤„„0„4„333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333332…D…E…E…K…N…O…O…`…`…u…w…x…x…ƒ…ƒ…‰‹4„x…ƒ…Š‹4„’’pssabrå¤ VL]£@9ÖßŲ’@Dell Laser Printer 1100Ne00:winspoolDell Laser Printer 1100Dell Laser Printer 1100Üß š 4dXPRIV  4š Courier NewdX2222222222Dell Laser Printer 1100Üß š 4dXPRIV  4š Courier NewdX2222222222€ƒ…ƒ…¬†<ƒ…ƒ…3„P@’’Unknown’’’’’’’’’’’’G‡z €’Times New Roman5€Symbol3& ‡z €’Arial3‡z €’Times"ˆ€õŠīĖ¤FØÓ¤fEiÓ·vGżÓ·vGż$€õ;€„ĄxxƒC‹C‹3ƒ€õ;€ßßš’?’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’@9Ö’’HThe last decade or so has seen a significant change in cognitive scienceDepartment of Psychologypssabrž’ą…ŸņłOh«‘+'³Ł0Ō˜ ō$0<L \h „  œ Ø“¼ÄĢäIThe last decade or so has seen a significant change in cognitive scienceahe Department of Psychology seepaepaNormalepssabre3saMicrosoft Word 10.0@ŅIk@ź»•lWĀ@Õ÷vhĘ@øęé6iĘÓ·vž’ÕĶ՜.“—+,ł®DÕĶ՜.“—+,ł®ˆD hp˜ Ø °øĄČ Š %äUniversity of ĢĒŠÄTVsżGC‹{ IThe last decade or so has seen a significant change in cognitive science Titleą 8@ _PID_HLINKSäA˜/&/http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Dewey/reflex.htm  !"#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ[\]^_`abcdež’’’ghijklmž’’’opqrstuvwxyz{|}~€‚ƒ„…†‡ˆ‰Š‹ŒŽ‘’“”ž’’’–—˜™š›œž’’’žŸ ”¢£¤ž’’’ż’’’ż’’’Øž’’’ž’’’ž’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’Root Entry’’’’’’’’ ĄF@ØŲž6iĘŖ€Data ’’’’’’’’’’’’f1Table’’’’nÅLWordDocument’’’’%ŹSummaryInformation(’’’’’’’’’’’’•DocumentSummaryInformation8’’’’’’’’CompObj’’’’’’’’’’’’j’’’’’’’’’’’’ž’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’’ž’ ’’’’ ĄFMicrosoft Word Document MSWordDocWord.Document.8ō9²q